A Long, Hot Summer: The 1964 Columbia Avenue Race Riot and the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia

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On Friday, August 28, 1964 at approximately 9:20 PM, Black police officer Robert Wells made a routine stop when he discovered a stalled car parked diagonally on the intersection of Twenty-second Street and Columbia Avenue in North Philadelphia, blocking both lanes of traffic. When Wells approached the vehicle, married couple Odessa and Rush Bradford, both Black, age thirty-four, and intoxicated, were involved in a domestic dispute. According to the Official Police Report, when Wells intervened, “She [Odessa] cursed, punched, and kicked at him and her husband.” John Hoff, a white police officer, soon provided backup and the two officers attempted forcibly to remove Odessa from the vehicle. While the interaction escalated, a crowd formed on the busy street during peak nightlife hours. By 9:28 PM, the violence intensified when a man from the crowd, James Mettles, charged the police officers. Officer Wells reported that at the time of the initial incident, there were already seventy-five to eighty onlookers at the scene, all witnessing the attacker who “fought like a madman.”

By the time that Mettles and Bradford were arrested, a large crowd had gathered. The heavy concentration of bars and nightclubs that came alive on Friday nights on Columbia Avenue served as a breeding ground for rumors to spread and for angry onlookers to rush to the scene. A resident, later identified as the local Black Nationalist organizer Shaykh Muhammad, spread a false rumor proclaiming that a white police officer had beaten a pregnant Black woman, instigating the crowd. The rumor further exacerbated preexisting tensions about police brutality against Black individuals in the neighborhood, which Philadelphia newspapers had been regularly reporting in preceding years. The disproportionate incarceration rates of Black individuals in Philadelphia and the tensions between North Philadelphia residents and the police merited the conclusion (although not unanimously so) that the riot was a spontaneous reaction to decades of systematic oppression.

The Columbia Avenue riot followed a wave of race riots that occurred throughout the United States in the summer of 1964, a pattern that would continue throughout the 1960s, where racial tensions exploded into violent confrontations.

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7 “Official Police Report on Riot.”


10 This essay will use the term “race riot” to define the incident on Columbia Avenue. There is no single explanation for the Columbia Avenue riot, but the rioters were motivated by a combination of unemployment, poor housing conditions, and decades of exploitation and discrimination. However, the Columbia Avenue race riot was above all an act of rebellion against the oppression of the white power structure. As in most race riots of the decade, the violence in Philadelphia involved Black rioters targeting white-owned businesses. Although riots have a clear start and end date, the ongoing racial conflict that
The majority of race riots in the 1960s significantly affected the Jewish community, since almost all businesses targeted by looting, violence, and vandalism were Jewish-owned. The Columbia Avenue Riot was no exception. The role of the organized Jewish community in the riot can be specifically examined through the work of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia (JCRC), an organization established in 1939 that still exists today.11 The JCRC was principally conceived as a means for establishing local dialogue and programming among interfaith and interreligious communities.12 While it concerned itself with issues like Israel and Holocaust remembrance, in the 1960s, its efforts focused particularly on Black-Jewish relations.13

Historically, the Columbia Avenue neighborhood in North Central Philadelphia had a large Jewish population, but following national demographic trends of white flight, Jews increasingly moved out of lower-income neighborhoods in the postwar era just as the Black population began to rise.14 This created an unequal balance of power in the Black-Jewish relationship along both class and racial lines, since Jews were often the landlords and business owners in Black neighborhoods, yet lived elsewhere in emerging middle class areas of the city. Although the Columbia Avenue riot was a spontaneous and unorganized uprising, many Jews felt victimized by the events and suggested anti-Semitism as a potential motivating factor.15 Likewise, Black leaders held Jewish merchants and landlords partly accountable, with claims of exploitative business and housing practices as one of the greatest causes of racial tensions in the neighborhood.16

While contemporary observers and historians have viewed the riot as the nadir in the fallout between Blacks and Jews, Black and Jewish leaders, along with some elected officials, did rally together for a common cause in the midst of the riot. The storeowners affected by the looting were predominantly Jewish, motivating the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia to assume a particularly large role in the riot’s aftermath.17 As the violence settled, collaboration deteriorated between Black and Jewish groups as deep-seated tensions between the two communities surfaced more visibly. Blacks and Jews differed in their assessments of what had predicated violence, expressed divergent perceptions of the police response, and disagreed about the best strategies to employ going forward. The effects of the riot on either group differed as well. Jews were the obvious and visible victims of the riot’s property damage. However, it was the Black community who actually resided on Columbia Avenue that suffered the more long-term consequences of the neighborhood’s subsequent deterioration, a factor that often went unnoticed by the city administration and the media. The riot altered the JCRC’s approach to Black-Jewish relations in two key respects. First, the riot intensified long-existing hostilities between the Black and Jewish communities in neighborhoods like Columbia Avenue on both an organizational and interpersonal level. Second, the violence radicalized Jewish public opinion. As Black residents grew increasingly distrustful of Jewish business owners and organizations, some Jewish Philadelphians expressed waning support for the JCRC’s civil rights efforts, complicating the organization’s mandate to improve the relationship between Blacks and Jews.

The traffic stop on August 28, 1964, was minor, but the dissemination of the rumor and the swelling vengeful energy of the angry crowd precipitated an escalation of violence. Around 9:45 PM, rioters started raining bricks and debris down from rooftops.18 By 11:15 that night, the crowd had grown in size to about five hundred, and rioters enacted more overt violence as they threw bricks and objects directly at police and police cars; they also began to smash store windows and vandalize shops.19 By approximately 11:45, outright looting commenced, resulting in police officers making their first arrests around 2:00 AM on Saturday morning.20 Looting continued until dawn, and the riot’s epicenter expanded from Twenty-second Street and Columbia Avenue to the surrounding blocks. By the

fueled the escalation of violence extended long before and after this temporal confine.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
riot’s conclusion, “there was hardly a store with glass intact on Columbia from 15th to 24th Street, or on Ridge from Columbia to Jefferson.”

Black civil rights and community leaders tried almost immediately to prevent the riot from escalating, although to little success. Participating leaders included Congressman Robert Nix, Reverend Leon Sullivan, Stanley Branche, head of CORE, and Georgie Woods, a popular disc jockey and radio personality. Cecil B. Moore, the militant NAACP branch president and a resident of North Central Philadelphia, was in Atlantic City, New Jersey, attending the Democratic National Convention at the time of the riot, but arrived by 3:45 AM on Saturday. The city administration specifically requested his assistance to quell the violence. Despite his prominence in the neighborhood, he tried with little avail to stop rioters and a *Sunday Bulletin* headline read, “Crowd Jeers Cecil Moore, Ignored Pleas to Disperse.” Florence Mobley, later identified as a major perpetrator of the riot, reportedly yelled at Moore, “we don’t need the NAACP; we don’t need civil rights; and we don’t need Cecil Moore. There are enough of you out here to kill all the...cops.” The crowd’s resistance to Black leadership demonstrated the pervasive mob mentality, although only a minority of the Black community participated in the riot. Rioters were motivated in part by incontrollable rage and a quest to gain material possessions from looted bounty. They also considered the riot a symbolic rebellion against the oppression of Black people. While Black organizational leaders promoted a vision of racial equality that many rioters likely shared, they condemned the senselessly violent tactics. Black leaders’ inability to halt the rioters indicates the limitations of institutional actors, and suggests that within the Black community (just as within the Jewish community), a disparity existed between organizations and public sentiments.

On August 29 at 11:00 AM, the Municipal Commission on Human Relations called for a meeting of community leaders to help assess the situation. They concluded, “The principle recommendation to which the group unanimously agreed was that the Mayor and the police use whatever force necessary to restore law and order to the community.” At noon, Democratic Mayor James H. J. Tate held a press conference where he declared an Emergency Proclamation. He defined the riot area from Poplar Street to Lehigh Avenue and from Tenth to Thirty-third Streets (Figures 1 & 2), and commanded everyone in the area “to immediately disperse themselves and peaceably depart to their habitation or to their lawful businesses.” This emergency provision lasted until September 8 and established a curfew, shutting down all establishments that sold liquor and requiring all citizens to return home upon the discretionary request of police officers. Many residents ignored the curfew, leading to more arrests. Leaders such as Cecil B. Moore sharply criticized the Mayor’s proclamation, particularly in the middle of the hot summer, and declared it “unenforceable,” warning, “If these people stayed in their homes, they’d roast to death.” The proclamation also restricted the right of residents to assemble publicly, with the sole exception of Sunday, August 30th. Mayor Tate recognized the importance of church in the Black community and permitted attendance for worship, although he strongly encouraged congregants to stay home and many

21 Berson, *Case Study of a Riot*, 16.
23 Berson, *Case Study of a Riot*, 17.
ministers canceled services. Tate forced the NAACP to cancel its previously scheduled voter registration and education rally in Fairmount Park over Labor Day weekend, even though he had already issued a permit. Angry members of the community interpreted Tate’s actions as a sign that he distrusted Black people and considered them incapable of assembling peacefully.

On Saturday, August 29, during the daylight hours following the riot, the scene remained relatively quiet, but by 9:00 PM, another wave of rioting swept through the neighborhood. The same pattern of peace during the day followed by evening looting occurred on Sunday, although more sporadically and without major incident. By Monday, August 31, Columbia Avenue remained calm and the city administration declared the riot over. The police presence peaked at 3,500 officers over the ten-day period from August 28 to September 8, referred to by the Police Department as “Operation Columbia.” Mayor Tate insisted that he would call in state police or the National Guard if it became necessary, although they were never called back up became necessary, although they were never called to the scene. In retrospect, observers credited these police decisions for bringing the Philadelphia riot to a relatively quick conclusion, and for limiting the damage compared to the hundreds of riots that erupted during America’s “long, hot summers” from 1964 to 1968.

Nevertheless, the total damage in the Columbia Avenue race riot was staggering. Although the final counts differed, the riot led to approximately 300 arrests, 339 injuries, including to 100 police officers, along with three million dollars in property damage, not to mention overtime payment for police officers who worked upwards of twelve hour shifts during the incident. There were two deaths, both civilians “who were shot while assaulting police officers.” One of the victims was identified as twenty-one year old Robert Green, who reportedly charged an officer with a knife. Curiously, the two fatalities garnered little media attention. In fact, many journalists appeared unaware of their occurrence and failed to report them at all. Historical accounts of the riot also fail to identify the two victims or offer explanations for what alterations occurred. For all the injuries, property damage and even two deaths, the Columbia Avenue riot paled in comparison to the destruction witnessed in other American cities during the 1960s, most notably the Watts Riot in Los Angeles in August of 1965. Watts was also sparked by a traffic incident, yet by comparison, it would claim thirty-four lives, four thousand arrests, and thirty-five million dollars’ worth of property damage.

The Riot and Anti-Semitism

Although most Philadelphians reacted in horror to the pure destruction and violence of the riot, the Jewish community responded with a particular and distinct set of concerns. The JCRC issued a quick public response and its leaders felt compelled to act, since so many Jews were affected. The JCRC explicitly focused on the riot’s immediate effects on the Jewish community and provided suggestions for dealing with the ongoing situation. In a memorandum released on August 31, Executive Director Jules Cohen specifically addressed constituents’ anxiety over anti-Semitism as a potential motivating factor for the riot.
The JCRC’s two chief concerns were the damage to Jewish-owned businesses and the negative implications that the riot might have on Black-Jewish relations. According to Cohen, the riots threatened to undermine relations between Blacks and Jews, particularly because so many Jewish Philadelphians believed that anti-Semitism had been a root cause of the violence. During the weekend of rioting, the JCRC hesitated to proclaim unequivocally that anti-Semitism played absolutely no role in the riot, although JCRC leadership clearly maintained an opinion that the riot was not caused by anti-Semitism. Leaders suggested that a thorough study would be necessary for more conclusive answers. This tactic allowed the JCRC to downplay the notion that hatred for Jews had sparked the riot while still validating anxious constituents with lived experiences of anti-Semitism. The JCRC’s leadership was eager to resume work on establishing interracial dialogue and providing direct aid to the riot’s victims; yet, its responsibility to address the needs of uneasy constituents demanded a response to pervasive concerns about anti-Semitism in subsequent public statements.

Because anti-Semitism provoked such widespread attention and panic within the Jewish community in the wake of the riot, the JCRC felt compelled to respond. For individual Jews, especially ones directly affected by the looting, anti-Semitism was not a theoretical concern, but a lived fear and a perceived threat to their safety. Jewish storeowner Morris Gerson, President of the North Central Retail Drug Association, wrote to Jules Cohen explaining how deeply he was unsettled by the riot. He compared the experience of having his store vandalized to the virulent anti-Semitism that Jews had experienced in Eastern Europe. For Gerson, “the Horrible nightmare” resembled “the Old Russian Pogroms.” In her 1971 book, *The Negro and the Jew*, Lenora Berson also perpetuated this image, titling her chapter on the race riot, “Riots and Pogroms.” The very notion of a pogrom carries particular meaning within the Jewish community, invoking feelings of vulnerability and fear. While in hindsight, it is clear that the Columbia Avenue riot does not meet such definition, during the weekend of rioting, some Jews truly believed that they had been victimized because of their ethnic identity.

Mayor Tate also addressed the issue of anti-Semitism, likely because of pressure from the JCRC and other Jewish agencies. By 10:30 PM on Sunday, August 30, Tate issued a press release that rejected anti-Semitism as a cause of the riot and concluded, “even the suggestion of such [anti-Semitism] can do serious damage to good intergroup relations which are essential to the welfare of the city.” He underscored the citywide concerns about targeting Jewish merchants—anxieties that extended beyond the bounds of Columbia Avenue. Mayor Tate and the JCRC shared the same pragmatic desire to reduce the emphasis on anti-Semitism as a cause of the riot. The very idea of an anti-Semitic motivation for rioting posed a direct threat to Black-Jewish relations and to Philadelphia’s community relations more generally. Tate and the JCRC perceived that severing ties between the Black and Jewish communities might endanger the city’s long-term stability and open the floodgates for further violence.

While anti-Semitism did not provoke the riot, looters did target white-owned businesses, and on Columbia Avenue, most of those were owned by Jews. Historian Matthew Countryman explains that of the 170 stores in a five-block radius of the Bradford incident, only fifty-four stores had been spared, fifty-two of which were Black-owned. Of the two remaining stores, one was owned by a Chinese family and the other was a clandestine abortion provider who served the neighborhood. Countryman explains that, “The only Black owned stores to be damaged over the course of the weekend were those that failed to identify themselves as such.” A few weeks after the incident, *Time Magazine* reported, “The only Negro store that got wrecked was owned by a man named Richberg. They thought he was a Jew. A Chinaman up there put a sign on his store saying, ‘I’m colored too!’” To many Jews, the pattern of looting provided evidence of anti-Semitism. However, the violence was more of a rebellion against “the economics of ghetto business rather than interpersonal relationships with merchants.” Rioting occurred around color lines, not based

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48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
55 Countryman, *Up South*, 159.
56 Ibid.
primarily on the reputations of merchants or their ethnic affiliations.

While JCRC leaders ruled out anti-Semitism as a proximate cause, the organization wanted to procure more decisive evidence to bolster its claim. At the end of September, Jules Cohen suggested "the possibility of having a study done in an effort to determine to what extent, if any, anti-Semitism may have been a factor."59 The American Jewish Committee (AJC), a JCRC member organization, independently launched an investigation60 that resulted in the 1966 publication of Case Study of A Riot: The Philadelphia Story, authored by Lenora Berson.61 Murray Friedman, director of the AJC, explained that the purpose of the publication was to identify potential causes of the riot and offer solutions to avoid racial violence in the future. He specified, “The results of this study are very gratifying because they clearly show that the riot was not anti-Semitic [sic] in character in spite of considerable anti-Jewish feelings in North Philadelphia which must be faced as an element in community tensions.”62 This report, conducted by the well-respected American Jewish Committee, firmly discounted anti-Semitism as a motivating factor in the riots, but it also revealed the racially charged tensions simmering in the neighborhood.

The JCRC's interest in anti-Semitism speaks to its focus on Jewish communal concerns throughout the handling of the riot. It would have been impossible for the JCRC to continue its efforts to maintain Black-Jewish dialogue and collaboration if the Jewish community was paralyzed by fear, and JCRC leaders recognized the need to address Jewish uneasiness in the wake of the riot. Combatting anti-Semitism was also something explicitly contained in the JCRC's mandate along with a broader program of social justice. The JCRC faced increasing challenges in addressing larger issues of poverty, housing, and unemployment after the riot. While these conditions motivated rioters, they affected the Black community far more acutely than they touched the JCRC's Jewish constituents. The JCRC was self-conscious of its limitations as a white organization, and its leaders understood that Black organizations needed to speak on behalf of their own community. Jules Cohen contemplated producing a joint statement together with the Board of Rabbis and the Council of Churches, such as in the Susquehanna riot,63 but he decided against it, writing, “there was a question as to whether the involvement of whites would help or exacerbate the feelings.”64 Cohen understood that during the riot, the JCRC could best serve the Philadelphia community by focusing on its Jewish constituents to avoid overstepping racial boundaries.

Reactions to Police Response

The riot exposed one of the key points of differentiation between the Black and Jewish communities, namely the radically divergent experience of each group with police. Many Jewish merchants who fell victim to frequent acts of vandalism and shoplifting expressed dissatisfaction with what they perceived as lenient police presence in the Columbia Avenue neighborhood. By contrast, many Black residents considered the neighborhood overly policed and believed that officers committed acts of brutality that overtly targeted Black individuals. The varied reactions to the police response in the riot underscored this distinction. It also revealed the disparity between organizational stances and public sentiments. Although the JCRC and virtually every other Jewish organization approved of the police's response during the weekend of rioting, many Jews who watched their stores destroyed with little police intervention disapproved of the police department's tactics.

As the JCRC was quick to point out, most of the violence during the riot targeted businesses rather than individuals.65 As a result of police experience in the Susquehanna Avenue riot, Police Commissioner Howard Leary indicated that his officers would favor protecting human lives over the potential destruction of property if future racial conflicts occurred.66 The JCRC commended police restraint for preventing an escalation of violence, especially in comparison to the militarized police responses to sit-ins and protests in the South. Cohen supported

61 Berson, Case Study of a Riot.
65 Ibid.
66 Berson, Case Study of a Riot, 17.
the city administration, insisting, “I believe the police acted very wisely in the circumstances. Had the police used the fire hoses, dogs, horses and other extreme measures which unthinking people called for, I am convinced Philadelphia would have been visited with a real blood bath.” Police actions were also dictated by logistical constraints. Officers were instructed to focus on the de-escalation of violence while minimizing arrests in order to keep officers on the scene, partially due to understaffing during the initial hours of the riot.

Not all members of the Jewish community shared the JCRC’s support of police tactics. Although the city administration insisted that the police had not been prevented from making arrests or banned from using violent measures when necessary, many merchants watched as their businesses were destroyed without police intervention. In the wake of the riot, some Jews, particularly those who lived or owned property near Columbia Avenue, criticized the police for their failure to control the looting and chaos. Police Commissioner Leary defended the department, explaining, “The Philadelphia Police Force does not use violent methods except when required to avoid imminent injury or death to either police officers or civilians.”

Jewish merchants’ dissatisfaction with the police was not just restricted to the weekend of the riot. Many Jewish business owners in North Philadelphia felt that the police had failed to protect them adequately for several years, and some concluded that with greater police intervention before the riot, the escalating violence might have been avoided. A merchant wrote to Mayor Tate on September 1, “Had the police apprehended the gang of vandals that ruined my store four times, perhaps this big one would not have happened.” For him, the persistent targeting of his store and the passivity of prior police responses provided a gateway for larger tensions. The fear of future eruptions of violence also lingered after the riot. Storeowners expressed particular concern that while they attended Jewish High Holidays services in September, their businesses would be at risk. Mayor Tate received letters from constituents, specifically asking for extra police presence during the Jewish holidays.

The disappointment with the police’s response transcended the concern of the Jewish community. The media mocked the police’s inaction and perceived weakness. A cartoon in a South Philadelphia newsletter depicted two police officers looking on as a hooded man with a gun in his pocket and nightstick in hand violently robs a store, and a merchant begs for help as his business is being looted (Figure 3). The officers are comically illustrated as caricatures, incompetent to provide any help. This depiction reflected the extreme outrage that many citizens felt, particularly those in the Jewish community. However, not everyone disagreed with the police response. Progressive minded Jews and other individuals recognized the police’s success in avoiding causalties, and commended them for such restraint.

While the Jewish community focused on the police response in terms of protection of property, the Black community expressed great concern about police brutality. Despite his militancy and general distrust of the police, during the riot Cecil B. Moore initially supported police behavior and collaborated with the city administration. On August 30, Moore emphasized that the “NAAACP does not intend to charge the police with brutality” and that only a few cases of violent police action had occurred during the riot (Figure 4). While Moore commended the police efforts in the three days of the riots from August 28 to 30, he claimed that the policing of the area from August 31 to September 7 demonstrated “vindictive racial bigotry.” According to Moore, the Black residents of Columbia Avenue were “as much victims of the riots as the merchants” due to their abuse by the police. The African-American Philadelphia Tribune reported that white

74 Cecil B. Moore, Letter to Mayor Tate, September 8, 1965. Box 15 Police Department A-4420, Folder: Police-North Philadelphia (2). Mayor’s Correspondences and Files Records, Administration of James H.J. Tate, Record No. 60.2.5. City Archives, Philadelphia.
75 Ibid.
police officers beat three different families inside of their homes on the Monday and Tuesday after the riot for disobeying the curfew. 76 The Police Advisory Board received one complaint on August 31, alleging that the police beat a man inside of his home and threw his sixteen-month-old baby across the room. 77 The complaint described the police violence “as a result of the rioting.” 78

Long before the riot occurred, police brutality preoccupied the Black community in North Central Philadelphia. While Jews often complained about lack of police protection, many Black individuals remembered being targeted and brutalized by police. Cecil B. Moore also compared the victimization of merchants during the riot with the long history of Black individuals being brutalized by the police. Moore went so far as to write to Mayor Tate demanding reparations for “Negroes and Whites who were victims of your police license to impose every form of brutal, humiliating and embarrassingly unlawful conduct.” 79 Moore claimed that if his request for monetary reparations were refused, the NAACP would boycott “subsidized merchants” who received citywide aid, and in his opinion, preferential treatment by the city’s administration. There is no evidence to prove that Moore’s demands were ever acknowledged or that the NAACP carried out its threat. Yet, the proposed boycott underscores that leaders understood almost immediately the long-term effects of the riot within the Black community of Columbia Avenue. While Jewish merchants who lost their stores were the most obvious and visible targets of the riot, the Black community, the majority of which did not participate in rioting, suffered the longstanding consequences of the neighborhood’s economic and physical deterioration. Like Jewish merchants, many Black residents also feared for their physical safety because of neighborhood crime, but also faced violence at the hands of the police.

Explanations of the Riot

When searching for an explanation for the riots, many groups attempted to interpret the violent rebellion in the context of the Civil Rights Movement. While the organized Jewish community acknowledged the systematic oppression that fueled the violence and its political implications, Jewish leaders generally rejected the notion that riots had a legitimate place in the struggle for civil rights. 80 For example, Jewish groups such as the Anti-Defamation League, a JCRC constituent, denied any permissible connection between the riots and the civil rights campaign, citing as evidence the support Black civil rights leaders gave to the de-escalation of violence. 81 Other contemporary sources argued that in fact, the riot made sense only within the context of the larger movement for equality. An article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch concluded that the Columbia Avenue riot should be contextualized as a reaction to the failures of legislative solutions like the Civil Rights Act, passed barely two months before the riot, which “hardly touches on the hopes for jobs and housing of Negro slum-dwellers in the North.” 82

The Black community often differed from Jews in interpreting the causes and meanings of the riots. In retrospect, several Black residents of North Philadelphia perceived the riot as an understandable response to the poor standard of living on Columbia Avenue. In an interview, local civil rights activist Kenneth Salaam remarked that fifty years after the riot, he “did feel that some way it was justified, because you know, a lot of them stores would be cheating us, you know, would be cheating the people!...And now’s the chance to get some things from them. Then again, a lot of people didn’t have a lot of things that those stores offered, you know, so it gave people the opportunity to get some things.” 83 For many underserved Philadelphians, the riot presented an opportunity to procure material possessions they could not otherwise afford. As Salaam explained, his perception of thieving Jewish merchants with exploitative credit practices, which he may have very well experienced during his lifetime, served as a justification for looting. Photographs of grinning rioters walking away with heavy and expensive items perpetuated this image (Figure 5). However, this photograph also depicts women standing amidst the rubble with arms crossed and stern facial expressions.

78 Ibid.
79 Cecil B. Moore, Letter to Mayor Tate, September 8, 1965.
perpetrators of the riot. After two weeks, police arrested Shaykh Muhammad Hassan, known as Abyssinia Hayes, along with Raymond Hall, known as Yussef Abdullah, and Florence Mobley, all charged with inciting the riot.90 Muhammad was the leader of the African-Asian Culture Center on Twenty-third Street and Columbia Avenue as well as the National Muslim Improvement Association of America.92 The police detained Muhammad when they discovered Molotov cocktails, flammable liquids, pistols, knives, and clubs in the Center.93 The Official Police Report scapegoated Muhammad as the main perpetrator, but his influence over the crowd had, in fact, been fortuitous, since he had not premeditated inciting a riot, but had opportunistically reacted to the incident of perceived police brutality.94 He was not viewed as a community leader before or after the riot, also reinforcing that his position of influence over the crowds was solely coincidental.95

The media continuously painted an exoticized portrait of Muhammad as an eccentric radical. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported, “Muhammad appeared in court wearing a red fez and carrying a box he said contained his personal possessions. A pearl earring pierced his left ear.”96 The newspaper also claimed that, “Muhammad has been thrown out of the Black Muslims because he was ‘too militant,’ and later formed his own Black Nationalist supremacy group.”97 In an opinion piece for the Philadelphia Independent, the author condemned the media’s scrutiny of Muhammad, asserting that his original following consisted of only twenty-five people but, “In arresting him, the power structure has succeeded in doing for Muhammad what he couldn’t do for himself: they made a big man out of a little

86 Berson, Case Study of a Riot, 21.
91 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
one.” Muhammad received an eighteen-month jail sentence while Raymond Hall was given a ninety-day sentence, and Florence Mobley was freed without conviction. Cecil B. Moore served as Muhammad’s defense attorney during the trial (Figure 6), and claimed that Muhammad had actually attempted to calm down the crowd and that his trial was discriminatory, citing his exorbitant $10,000 bail as evidence of racist treatment. As the city began prosecuting arrested looters by October, officials used the trial process as an opportunity to reestablish a sense of law and order after the riot’s lawlessness and to take a harsher stance on the rioters than they had when events were unfolding.

The Jewish community did not have a unified response in reacting to the role of these Black Muslims in the riot. Overall, there is little evidence that the JCRC expressed explicit discomfort about the religious identity of the perpetrators. One Jewish Exponent reporter wrote in grossly exaggerated terms about “the currently inherent hatred of ‘Muslims’ towards Jews,” but asserted unequivocally that this “had little to do with the explosion.” Maurice Fagan, head of the Fellowship

The JCRC adopted a rhetorical strategy that consistently distinguished between the small minority of rioters and the larger Black community. Jules Cohen commended the support of Black organizational leaders, as juxtaposed to his labeling the individuals responsible for the riot, as “hoodlums and a disgrace to the community.” He specifically emphasized that the efforts of Black organizations to quell the riot successfully prevented it from becoming as explosive and destructive as other riots that occurred in the summer of 1964. The JCRC maintained its commitment to improving Black-Jewish relations even as many members of the Jewish community grew disillusioned and struggled to sympathize with the Black community, although they too suffered from riot. As historian Cheryl Lynn Greenberg explains, “the JCRC continued to engage in civil rights efforts after the riots had chased more fainthearted sympathizers away.” A 1967 report conducted by the National Community Relations Advisory Council concluded, “every city experiencing one or more riots reported some Jewish backlash. This varied in intensity from ‘indifference’ (presumably replacing a more active concern) about civil rights.

The JCRC’s Programming in the Riot’s Aftermath

In the wake of the riot, the JCRC focused much of its efforts on preserving the Jewish community’s commitment to civil rights. It admitted that the riot was a “serious set back to the civil rights movement,” presumably in fear that the riot would perpetuate white backlash. The JCRC adopted a rhetorical strategy that consistently distinguished between the small minority of rioters and the larger Black community.

References:


106 Meeting Minutes, Fellowship Commission Committee on Community Tensions, Subject: Case Study of A Riot, March 4, 1966.


109 Ibid.

and related issues to resentment and hostility towards Negro demands.”

“Jewish backlash” was not only aimed against the Black community, but many also blamed Jewish organizations. In an article in the *Jewish Times*, one reader proclaimed,

We now see our ‘escape artists’—JCRC I mean—write articles in the ‘Exponent’ to explain the Negro frustrations that cause them to do this. We see the JCRC call upon the Jews to ‘understand’ the Negro—and maybe the police and the police commissioner too—and maybe Mayor Tate needs to be understood. This much some of us understand, that so long as our Jewish leadership and our spokesmen hold Jewish rights so cheap, we must expect Negroes, police and Mayor Tate to treat us as they do and spit in our eye. We get what we ask for!!

While there was always a gap between the organizational and individual commitment to the Black-Jewish relationship, the riot exposed many attitudes and frustrations that Jews had long harbored. Despite its best efforts, the JCRC was unable to keep organizational actions and Jewish public sentiments aligned, an issue that would influence all of its programming in relation to the riot.

One of the JCRC’s first organized responses was a meeting of the Citizens Emergency Committee of North Philadelphia on September 3, a group formed by Black leaders during the Commission on Human Relations’ meeting convened in the midst of the riot on August 29. Historian Matthew Countryman explains that the Emergency Committee strove to form a coalition between Black residents and Jewish storeowners. The moderate Black leaders who formed the committee chose to reach out to white moderates like those who participated in the JCRC rather than more influential, radical Black leaders like Cecil B. Moore. Countryman writes, “By choosing to work with the white storeowners rather than with militant activists who could be said to be more closely attuned to the rioters’ anger, the black leaders of the citizens’ committee were clearly revealing the depth of their commitment to the colorblind ideal.”

The JCRC participated as a representative of the business community. During the meeting, Jules Cohen reported that upon his suggestion, Mayor Tate agreed to form a committee to study the effect of the riots on civil rights. Cohen also added, “the demonstrations had definite civil rights implications, and that all our agencies should have exerted more pressure on the power structure in Philadelphia to create better housing, job and educational opportunities for Negroes.” While the JCRC earned praise from colleagues in the liberal-minded environment of the Emergency Committee Meetings, much of the discussion excluded the increasingly prevalent radical voice in Philadelphia’s Civil Rights Movement. It also ignored those Jews who were disillusion with these liberal campaigns in the wake of the riot.

The JCRC spearheaded the planning of a Unity Rally scheduled for September 14 to be held at Emanuel Institutional Baptist Church in North Philadelphia. The flyer for the event read that its purpose was “To demonstrate that North Philadelphia is a community in which Negro and white residents have been friendly neighbors for years and that the unfortunate disorders of the week-end of August 28th will not be permitted to spoil the good name and record of North Philadelphia for good interracial and interreligious relations.”

The program included remarks the church’s reverend, Jules Cohen of the JCRC, and William H. Guben, president of the Columbia Avenue Businessmen’s Association. Notable civil rights leaders were again not present and the event followed the JCRC’s rhetoric of emphasizing dialogue by bringing together people from different backgrounds in a collective space to talk and socialize.

By mid-September, Jules Cohen wrote to other Community Relations Councils across the country, updating them on the JCRC’s reaction to the riot. He commented on several patterns in the Columbia Avenue incident that might be relevant to other northern cities. He remarked that

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113 Countryman, *Up South*, 161.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid., 162.


117 Ibid.


119 Ibid.

despite the existence of Businessmen's Associations, most of which had disproportionately Jewish membership, many merchants and residents lacked substantive interaction with one another and that that there was “poor or non-existent public relations of the merchants.”121 He suggested concrete steps that other community relations organizations could take to prevent riots, including programming to “bring about a joint committee of the businessmen and Negro community leader that will meet on a regular, on-going basis.”122 This essentially proposed an expansion of dialogue-based programs like the Dinner Meetings between Black and Jewish community leaders that the JCRC had already developed. He admitted that his suggestions were “no substitution for grappling with the root causes of the racial crisis, but who knows—establishing such relationships may help to prevent violence and disorder.”123 While the JCRC's rhetoric of dialogue continued after the riot, it lowered the threshold for what it considered successful programming. Cohen was more concerned with avoiding violent confrontation than establishing genuine friendships between Blacks and Jews.

For the Philadelphia business community, the need to rebuild stores was the primary concern in the wake of the riot. While many looked to the JCRC and Jewish organizations for help, the city administration ultimately had the most impact on this front. On August 29 before the looting had even ended, Allen F. Peters, President of the United Businessman's Association, wrote a letter to Mayor Tate explaining that, “The businessmen in the damaged areas have requested that the matter of reimbursement for damage, vandalism, looting and theft be referred to City Counsel, or the appropriate bureau, for immediate action.”124 In the aftermath, many merchants had difficulties with insurance companies and asked both Mayor Tate and the JCRC for aid in investigating and supporting restitution claims.125 On September 1, JCRC President Robert K. Greenfield and Jules Cohen mailed a letter to the Mayor, commending his work on behalf of Jews, writing, “We appreciate particularly, your program of city assistance in securing prompt financial aid for those stricken businessmen who require it...”126 While the JCRC pushed for victims to receive compensation, the city did not begin to pay the merchants’ claims until January of the following year, and only fifty percent of those merchants were insured for property damage.127 Given the long delay in payments and issues of physical safety, many business owners could not or chose not to reopen their stores. While the JCRC made significant efforts to aid merchants, the city administration's delay stifled its efforts.

The Long-Term Effects on Philadelphia

While the riot may have offered a symbolic protest against the white power structure, it also wreaked havoc on the wellbeing of its Black residents. North Philadelphia became a food desert after the riot, with few options for places to shop besides neighborhood stores. Many of the stores attacked during the riot boarded up and never returned, which caused immediate and long-term hardship for the community. The Black community that suffered the consequences of the absence of shopping options and resources also developed bitterness toward the Jewish community at large, complicating the imagining of a Black-Jewish alliance.

Despite initiatives undertaken by the JCRC and the Philadelphia community in the wake of the riot, the situation begs the question, what, really, had been done? Although the JCRC and other organizations, both Jewish and non-Jewish, garnered much media attention for their engagement in substantive programming after the riot, it remains doubtful that significant change actually occurred.128 In February of 1965, Mayor Tate expressed disappointed at the lack of progress, specifically in improving communication between merchants and residents. He wrote, “At a meeting of the officers of the Columbia Avenue Businessman's Association...I noticed with much dismay that the proposed ‘joining of hands’ among the merchants and the local community groups in the Columbia Avenue area has not been accomplished during these past months.”129 While many committees were formed and meetings

122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
129 James H. J. Tate, Letter to Tina V. Weintrub, Deputy Managing Director of Mayor Tate, February 5, 1965. Box 16 Police Department A-4421, Folder: Columbia Avenue Riot. Mayor's Correspondences and Files Records, Administration...
conducted, Tate remarked that these all ended “without decision or conclusion.” Mayor Tate recommended that the Commission on Human Relations and the JCRC meet to establish more effective long-term programming. About a month later, a JCRC officer concluded that while programs existed to remedy the social and economic conditions of the neighborhood, he pessimistically predicted, “resentment and potential for overt hostility will remain.”

As passionately as the JCRC worked for change, the organization represented part of the white establishment that the rioters rebelled against. The same JCRC officer quipped, “There was agreement that government and agencies such as JCRC are viewed with suspicion by the local population, and therefore, the Commission and JCRC will have to remain in the background.” This realization pushed the JCRC to retreat toward programming that more directly benefited its own Jewish constituents, not out of abandonment for the civil rights cause, but because of a genuine belief that this would be the most effective method to initiate change and promote Black-Jewish relations.

In subsequent summers, the Philadelphia community lived in fear of more riots and enacted preventative measures. In the summer of 1965, a few JCRC leaders including President Sydney C. Orlofsky toured “neighborhoods in which riots were likely to take place,” spoke to merchants and residents in the area, and continued to support the Columbia Avenue Businessmen’s Association. Rumors of riots recurred throughout the 1960s, especially during the summer months. After more severe riots erupted across the United States, Mayor Tate enacted laws strengthening riot control measures by making destroying property and disobeying city curfews felonies. Riots in Philadelphia seemed so imminent that in the summer of 1967, Tate declared a State of Limited Emergency that restricted the right of public assembly, a measure that received significant backlash for its threat to civil liberties. Critics of the mayor charged that such measures had the potential for a self-fulfilling prophecy, possibly setting the stage for another riot, although one never occurred. The JCRC supported Tate’s efforts, even the controversial declaration, and JCRC representatives served in an advisory position with then Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo.

While the JCRC continued its attempts to improve Black-Jewish relations, its agenda often differed from the priorities outlined by Philadelphia’s civil rights coalition. In 1965, the NAACP began a massive protest of Girard College, a boarding school for orphaned boys located in North Philadelphia that excluded Black students. The Girard College protests became a symbol of Black resistance and even garnered a visit from Martin Luther King Jr. The successful protests, which ultimately forced the school to integrate, represented one of the most pivotal events in Philadelphia’s civil rights history. Yet, the JCRC was involved only as a minor player in the demonstrations. JCRC members participated in an interreligious march sponsored by the NAACP, yet its limited involvement suggests the weakening of its relations with the organized Black community. Tensions between the JCRC and the NAACP came to a fore in 1967 when Cecil B. Moore made overtly anti-Semitic slurs in a court proceeding, earning him widespread condemnation from the Jewish community and further distancing the two organizations.

However, collaboration with the Black community remained a part of the JCRC agenda, even if it became less

of James H.J. Tate, Record No. 60.2.5. City Archives, Philadelphia.
130 Ibid.
131 Terry C. Chisholm, Letter to Mayor Tate, Subject: North Philadelphia Merchant-Community Program, March 1, 1965, Box 16 Police Department A-4421, Folder: Columbia Avenue Riot. Mayor’s Correspondences and Files Records, Administration of James H.J. Tate, Record No. 60.2.5. City Archives, Philadelphia.
132 Ibid.
138 Countryman, Up South, 170.
139 Arnold, Building the Beloved Community, 65.
prominent than in previous years. For example, in 1966, Jules Cohen and Cecil B. Moore participated in a public discussion on Black-Jewish relations. During the meeting, Moore warned that the failure to improve living conditions for Blacks would likely lead to further violence, ominously predicting that “if the needs of the Negro are not filled...the next riot will not be in the Negro ghettos or in North Philadelphia. They will be everywhere.” For its part, the JCRC internally considered offering to help the Black community establish a “Negro Community Relations Council” following the JCRC’s model. Ultimately, Cohen decided not to suggest it formally, perhaps because he recognized the potential for such intervention to be perceived as intrusive and presumptuous of the needs of the Black community.

The riot did not mark the point of deterioration between the JCRC and Black community; rather, it suggested the inherent weakness in this relationship that had existed all along. As North Philadelphia, and other struggling neighborhoods in Philadelphia increasingly deteriorated, the JCRC once again found it necessary to recalibrate its work to meet the needs of its constituents. The perceived threat against Jewish merchants and the sense that Jewish safety was insecure in North Philadelphia grew stronger in the years following the riot, as “law and order” increasingly became a hot-button political issue. Merchant safety emerged as one of the JCRC’s chief concerns in the aftermath of the Columbia Avenue race riot and led to a shift in its approach to Black-Jewish relations in the 1970s.

The JCRC programming in the 1970s was conceived of in three parts. First, it developed a survey to assess the attitudes and demographic information of Jewish merchants operating in the inner city. The survey’s most significant finding was that half of Jewish business owners desired to sell their stores. Merchants offered a variety of explanations for why they wanted to leave, ranging from fears of personal safety, loss of profits, or simply hopes of retiring. Yet, it was difficult for merchants to find prospective buyers, and many felt conflicted in abandoning their old neighborhoods. The survey’s findings suggested the JCRC’s next step of programming, the Merchant Program, consciously framed under the realm of Black-Jewish relations. This paired Jewish business owners looking to sell their shops with potential Black buyers. To ensure the viability of the Black owned businesses, the JCRC facilitated legal work, applied for bank loans on the buyer’s behalf, and supplemented job training. The last phase of the JCRC’s efforts occurred simultaneously. It sought to assist the fifty percent of Jewish merchants who wanted to stay in their neighborhoods through safety training and advocating for an increase of merchant security.

The JCRC’s Merchant Program ultimately failed. Transacted businesses increasingly began to flounder as soon as the JCRC was no longer actively involved. By 1974, only twenty-two out of forty-four exchanges businesses were still in operation, and those that remained were largely the most recent transactions. Negative feedback from the outcome of the project and deteriorating economic conditions of the mid-1970s forced the extinction of the Merchant Program.

Years after the Columbia Avenue race riot, little had effectively aided the community that lived there. While Jews had the upward mobility to leave their places of business, many Black Americans did not have the ability or the desire to simply leave their neighborhood behind. Few Jewish merchants remained in the district. Not all demonized the Jews for leaving. In a 1974 article “Businessmen Survey Scene Ten Years Later,” sixty-seven year old Black resident Aaron Shannon recalled, “All of storekeepers were my friends. They were white people but they were friends to me. I hate to see it (the riot) but it was done, and I couldn’t blame them for leaving. Columbia Ave. was a beautiful place to have business. Now everybody’s afraid to walk the streets.” The Jews’ abandonment of inner city neighborhoods revealed a picture of Blacks and Jews both spatially separated and figuratively living worlds apart. The complicated interplay between race, violence, class, and identity politics is one that still marks the relationship between the two communities. While black-Jewish relations changed due to the

race riot and shifting local and national contexts, this was not an abrupt retreat from the so-called “Golden Age” of black-Jewish relations, but rather a culmination of long-simmering tensions. By relinquishing the trope of a bygone, imagined era of harmonious alliance between blacks and Jews, and searching instead for the partnerships and problems that have long existed, it is possible to focus on moving forward toward a future of collaboration.

Figure 1. Map of the riot zone area in North Central Philadelphia.

Figure 2. Contemporary rendering of the riot area.

Figure 3. Cartoon in South Philadelphia West Review.


151 Hannah Fagin, created using Google Maps, October 4, 2016.

Figure 4. Photograph of violent police interaction during the riot.  

Figure 5. Photograph of man looting an appliance while two concerned women interact on the leftmost side of the image.  

Figure 6. Photograph of Cecil B. Moore (left) with Shaykh Muhammad (right) in court.  

